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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE-PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES
State ex rel. Gray v. Jensen1
In 1960 the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure were revised, one of the pur-
poses being to broaden rules of discovery. Two of the rules relating to interroga-
tories were intended to lessen controversy over the scope of discovery: Rule
56.01(a) allows for written interrogatories to an adverse party,2 and Rule
57.01(b) defines the permissible scope of the interrogatories.3 However certain
problems have arisen in this area.
1. 395 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
2. Mo. R. Cirv. P. 56.01(a). The relevant portions of the Rule are as fol-
lows: "Any party may serve upon any party written interrogatories to be answered
by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a
partnership or association, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such informa-
tion as is available to the party...
"Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into
under Rule 57, and the answers may be used to the same extent as provided in
Rule 57 for use of the deposition of a party. .. ." Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(a).
3. Mo. R. Crv. P. 57.01(b). "(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court as provided by this Rule, the deponent may be examined re-
garding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party.... It is not ground
for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence. The examining party may not inquire as to the contents or substance of
statements, written or oral, obtained from prospective witnesses by or on be-
half of another party. The production or inspection of any writing obtained or
prepared by the adverse party or coparty, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or
agent, in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial (except a statement
given by the interrogating party) or of any writing that reflects an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided
in Rule 60.01, the conclusions of an expert, shall not be required."
In the Note to the Rule, the committee gave its reasons for specifically stat-
ing that work product of the lawyer is to be protected. The committee stated that
"the last sentence is adapted from Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, No.
26.02." The committee obviously felt that reliance on case precedent for protection
of work product would give rise to some uncertainty. Therefore, "The opinion of
Hickman v. Taylor . . . protecting the attorney's work product is reinforced by
express specific language of the added sentences." Special Comm. on Suggestions
Concerning the Rules of Civ. Prac. & Proc., Note, Mo. R. Cxv. P. 56.01 (herein-
after cited as Note, Mo. R. Civ. P.).
(303)
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In 1963, the Missouri Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Rhodes v. Crain,4
allowed the following interrogatory under Rules 56.01 (a) and 57-01(b):
Do you or your attorneys know the names of any witnesses to this acci-
dent? If so, what are the names and addresses of the witnesses?
The majority of the court held that the interrogatory did not involve work prod-
uct of the attorney. It found that adoption of the new civil rules was intended to
broaden discovery. Since the rules were based on similar federal rules,6 the su-
preme court looked to federal decisions for precedent.6
In a recent case the Missouri Supreme Court was confronted with a slight
variation of the interrogatory in Crain. Defendant sent plaintiff various written
interrogatories, including one that requested the plaintiff to
State the names and addresses of all witnesses whom plaintiff intends to
call at trial.7
Plaintiff refused to answer this interrogatory, claiming that it sought information
constituting work product. The trial court ordered plaintiff to answer. Plaintiff
appealed this order to the supreme court seeking prohibition of enforcement of
the order.
The Missouri Supreme Court granted the order of prohibition. The court first
took notice that the rules were to be given a broad interpretation. In allowing for
written interrogatories, Rule 56.01(a)
broadens the scope of discovery on written interrogatories by adopting
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a portion of the
amendments tentatively recommended by the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules in 1954.8
However, the supreme court found an exception to the broadened scope of dis-
covery in the notes of the committee that drafted the rules. The court likened
4. 373 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Mo. En Banc 1963), discussed in Divilbiss, Practice
and Procedure in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 18 (1965). See also, State ex rel.
Hudson v. Ginn, 374 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
5. Mo. R. Crv. P. 56.01 is based on FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Mo. R. Civ. P.
57.01(b) is based on FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
6. 373 S.W.2d at 42-43. The court discussed several cases at length: Baker
v. Yellow Cab Co., 12 F.R.D. 84 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d
533 (8th Cir. 1963); Wycoff v. Nichols, 32 F.R.D. 369 (W.D. Mo. 1962). The
supreme court also listed other cases in accord with its decision, including state
cases on similar procedural rules. 373 S.W.2d at 44.
7. This is not the actual interrogatory. However, the court treated the
decision as if this hypothetical were asked. The actual interrogatory inquired into
medical witnesses to be used by plaintiff at trial, in a malpractice action. The
actual interrogatory was "State the names and addresses of all doctors, medical
specialists or other practitioners of the healing arts that plaintiff intends to call as
witnesses to testify at the trial of this case." 395 S.W.2d at 144. The implications
of the interrogatory asking for names of expert witnesses rather than fact.witnesses
will be discussed infra.
8. Note, Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
(Vol. 31
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the committee's notes to legislative committee reports.9 As such, the notes are
applicable in construing the rule. The committee specifically stated
one portion of the recommended draft omitted is that which would re-
quire the answering party to furnish "a listing of the names of witnesses
whom the party intends to call at trial."'" (Emphasis added).
On this basis, the supreme court held that the interrogatory should not be answered.
A prime motivation for this result is the invasion of trial preparation and
strategy which would result if the interrogatory were answered. Trial strategy of
the lawyer is obviously his work product. The court felt protection of work
product took precedence over any argument for freedom of discovery. Furthermore,
the court stated
we think it crystal clear the committee which drafted Rule 56 did not
intend to permit the inquiry by interrogatory with which we here are
concerned.' 1
As a practical matter, to rule otherwise would have given the court future prob-
lems. For instance, would a party be allowed to call a witness whom he did not
intend to call at the time he answered the interrogatory?
In deciding Crain, the court used federal decisions as authority to allow the
discovery. The dissent disagreed with this approach. 12 In the noted case, the court
made no use whatsoever of federal decisions to bolster its opinion. Perhaps the
committee notes were considered sufficient on the matter. Whether this means the
court will no longer consider federal procedural decisions as authority is an open
question. It is reasonable to presume that when a state adopts a federal rule, such
as Missouri has done, it is aware of how the rule has been construed and, absent
contrary language, will presumably give the same construction to the rule. Never-
theless, it is possible the court's silence shows a change in its reasoning on what
is precedent for Missouri procedural rules.
While Professor Moore13 and some federal cases14 would allow discovery of
witnesses a party intends to call at trial, the decided majority of federal cases
9. The court stated that "These committee notes are comparable to legisla-
tive committee reports which pertain tolegislation which is passed and are to be
considered in determining the scope and meaning of the rule under consideration,
just as the legislative committee reports are considered in construing the legisla-
tive enactments." State v. Jensen, supra note 1, at 145.
10. Note, Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01. The Federal Rules contain no such provision.
11. 395 S.W.2d at 146.
12. 373 S.W.2d at 44. "The rulings of the federal courts upon their own rules
are not controlling and, to me, not particularly persuasive here."
13. 4 MooRE's FDEDAL PRAcTc § 26.19[4J, at 1251-56 (2d. ed. 1963).
Professor Moore states "We believe that, as a general proposition, cases requiring
the disclosure of witnesses whom a party intends to call better represent the basic
policy underlying the discovery rules." Id. at 1251-52. "Since a party clearly can
ascertain the names of all persons who mighzt be witnesses, under the specific
provision for discovery as to 'the identity and location of persons having knowl-
edge of relevant facts,' no good reason is seen why he should not have the right
1966]
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support the result in the present case.15 In Mageissen v. Local 51810 it was held
improper for an interrogatory to ask the other party "to state the names and
addresses of every witness you expect to use in the trial of this case." The ques-
tion that should have been asked was "state the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts."' T The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Bell v. Swift & Co.,18 after stating that Federal Rules 33 and 26(b)
should be construed broadly to allow discovery of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts, refused to allow an interrogatory asking a party to give names "of
witnesses he proposes to introduce at trial."'1 While these and other cases support
the result in the noted case, the Missouri Supreme Court declined to cite them as
authority.
Up to this point, the discussion has considered a general hypothetical inter-
rogatory. In the actual interrogatory in the noted case defendant asked plaintiff
to state the names and addresses of medical witnesses whom plaintiff intended
to call at trial.20 The court declined to consider the nature of the witnesses as sig-
nificant. Rather, it said,
The fact that Interrogatory No. 3 inquired about medical witnesses to be
used is of no particular significance. The result herein would have been
the same if it had asked generally for the names and addresses of all wit-
nesses to be called and used in the trial.
2
'
In so doing, the court obviously felt there was no distinction between fact
witnesses and expert witnesses. Defendant had in part relied on Miller v. United
to learn, at some reasonable time before trial, which of these persons will be wit-
nesses." Id. at 1253.
Moore cites Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. v. Thorden, 12 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), as illustrating why a party should not be required to disclose the witnesses
whom he intends to call at trial.
14. United States v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Kling v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1949). For a similar state deci-
sion, see State ex rel. Willey v. Whiteman, 91 Ariz. 120, 370 P.2d 273 (1962).
15. Wirtz v. Continental Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 564 (5th Cir. 1964);
Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 549 (2nd Cir. 1961); Bell v. Swift & Co.,
283 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1960); Wedding v. Tallant Transfer Co., 37 F.R.D. 8, 10
N.D. Ohio 1963); Magelssen v. Local 518, 32 F.R.D. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1963);
U.S. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 252, 255 (N.J. 1960); B. & S. Drilling
Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1, 3 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
Professor Moore recognizes this in his treatise, supra note 13, at 1247. See also, 2A
BARRON & HOL-ZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROcEDURE § 650, at 93 (Wright ed.
1961), which states "A distinction must be drawn between witnesses to the events
in question and witnesses who will be called for trial by the adverse party. The
names of occurrence witnesses may always be obtained by discovery. It is generally
held that a party is not entitled to find out, by discovery, which witnesses his op-
ponent intends to call at the trial." (Emphasis added)
16. See cases cited note 15 supra.
17. 32 F.R.D. at 465-66.
18. Supra note 15.
19. 283 F.2d at 409.
20. For the text of the actual interrogatory, see note 7 supra.
21. 395 S.W.2d at 146.
[Vol. 31
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States22 for authority on the need to know of the other party's expert witness. 2 3
That court categorized expert witnesses as ones who were not witnesses to the
actual facts, therefore not discoverable by an interrogatory asking for names of
witnesses to the occurrence. The issue of trial strategy was negated by the need
for the other party to find out about the qualifications of the expert. Therefore,
the expert who a party intended to use could be discovered.
Recently the Minnesota Supreme Court,24 which has discovery rules sub-
stantially the same as Missouri's,25 applied the rationale of the Miller case. The
pertinent interrogatory was as follows:
Do you know the names of any witnesses to this accident or the facts
pertinent to the above lawsuit?
Plaintiff did not disclose the name of an expert who the trial court allowed to
testify. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, stating:
If such an expert is to be called, he should not be given a preferred status
over other witnesses. Other parties ought to be given an opportunity to
investigate his qualifications and, if necessary, obtain the assistance of
equally qualified experts on the other side of the case 26
By refusing to draw the above distinctions, it would seem the Missouri Su-
preme Court has rejected them without actually so stating. Presumably a party
would have enough time to learn the qualifications of an expert after discovering
his identity at the pre-trial conference. It does not seem that an expert witness
would be discoverable under authority of the Crain case.
On balance, State v. Jensen upholds the right of the lawyer to retain the
secrecy of his trial strategy. This would seem to be fair, as Missouri rules explicit-
ly give protection to a lawyer's work product.2 7 The court has refrained from rely-
ing on federal case precedent in construing the Rules. It also ignored federal
and state precedent on distinguishing between fact witnesses and expert witnesses.
This points out that Missouri continues to protect the work product of the lawyer
with some rigidity. An important consideration of any lawyer is who he will call
to prove the necessary elements of his case. It would put an undue burden on
the lawyer if he were forced to tell his opponent what his trial presentation plans
were.
ROBERT L. JACKSON, JR.
22. 192 F. Supp. 218 (Del. 1961).
23. Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Respondent's contention on this issue was that,
"To permit counsel to fully explore the background of prospective witnesses, de-
termine their qualifications, and their interest in the outcome of the litigation, the
names and addresses of such witnesses must be disclosed well in advance of the
trial date." Ibid. At the pre-trial conference, both parties disclosed the names of
the expert witnesses they intended to use. Between the conference and the re-
scheduled trial date, one of plaintiff's doctors died. Defendant felt that because of
the situation he was entitled to inquire of plaintiff whom he intended to use.
24. Sanchez v. Waldrup, - Minn. - , 136 N.W.2d 61 (1965).
25. See note 3 supra, for the proposition that the committee looked to Minne-
sota Rules on the permissible scope of examination.
26. 136 N.W.2d at 65.
27. Work product in federal courts is dependent on the doctrine of Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19661
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY-MULTIPLE MANSLAUGHTER CHARGES
State v. Whitely'
Defendant, while driving his automobile, was involved in an accident in which
three persons in the other automobile were killed. He was subsequently charged
with manslaughter in three separate informations, each alleging the death of a
different person. He waived formal arraignment and pleaded guilty to each of the
three charges. The trial court imposed a two year sentence on each charge, said
sentences to run consecutively and not concurrently. Defendant appealed, contend-
ing he could be guilty of no more than one offense of manslaughter.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, deciding that there is a separate offense
of manslaughter for each person killed and that the rule that a person shall not
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is directed to the identity of the
offense not of the act. The court expressly stated that the case presented no ques-
tion of collateral estoppel,2 as the defendant had pleaded guilty to all three charges.
In Missouri the prohibition against being tried twice for the same "offense"
is recognized by both a constitutional provision3 and the common law.4 In other
jurisdictions there is a conflict in cases where multiple deaths arise from one auto-
mobile accident,5 due to the differing interpretations of the meaning of "offense."
The majority of courts hold the "gravamen of the offense" of manslaughter
to be the killing of a human being.0 Under such interpretation there is a distinct
offense for each death and multiple manslaughter charges arising out of a single
accident do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Some of the the-
ories upon which the courts have based this interpretation include: (1) same evi-
dence,7 (2) constructive intent,8 (3) public policy,9 (4) weight of authority,' 0
1. 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1965).
2. "Many courts refer to collateral estoppel as 'res judicata.' This should not
be confused with the concepts of merger and bar, whose criminal-law analogue is
double jeopardy." Mayers, New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAnv. L.
REv. 1, n. 148 (1960).
3. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 19.
4. Ex parte Dixon, 330 Mo. 652, 654, 52 S.W.2d 181, 182 (1932).
5. Annot., 172 A.L.R. 1053, 1062 (1948).
6. Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 219 S.W.2d 625 (1949); McHugh v. State,
160 Fla. 823, 36 So.2d 768, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); People v. Allen,
368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1937); Fleming v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 209, 144
So.d 220 (1940); State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937); Burton
v. State, 226 Miss. 31, 79 So.2d 242 (1955); Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765, 49
N.W.2d 611 (1951); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951); Fay
v. State, 620 Okla. Crim. 350, 71 P.2d 768 (1937); Lawrence v. Commonwealth,
181 Va. 582, 26 S.E.2d 54 (1943); State v. Taylor, 185 Wash. 198, 52 P.2d 1252
(1936). See generally, Annot., 172 A.L.R. 1053, 1062 (1948).
7. To determine if one is being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
the following test is generally used: If the facts charged would have warranted a
conviction on the first information, then the second information charges the same
offense and violates the prohibition. 15 AM. Jun. Criminal Law § 380 (1938). Many
of the cases point out that in a prosecution for the manslaughter of A, proof of the
death of B would not convict the defendant. Since proof of injuiry to a different
person is necessary in the second prosecution, different evidence will be necessary
[Vol. 31
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and (5) reliance on the strict wording of the statute defining the crime of man-
slaughter. 1
The minority find the "criminal act" of reckless disregard for the safety of
others in the operation of the auto to be the basis of the offense.12 Thus, one
charge of manslaughter constitutes jeopardy for the act or omission causing the
accident, and subsequent charges based on the accident are thereby barred re-
gardless of the number of deaths arising from the act or omission. The reason gen-
erally given to support this interpretation is that the existing criminal intent is
disregard for the safety of others. As no such disregard can exist as to one pas-
senger in an auto to the exclusion of the other passengers, there is a single crimi-
nal intent. There being a single criminal intent, there can be only one offense against
the state.1 3
Missouri, as a result of this decision, has adopted the majority position as to
the applicability of the double jeopardy provision in a case involving multiple
manslaughter in an automobile accident. However, does it necessarily follow that
a prosecutor can subsequently prosecute for each death if he feels a not guilty
verdict was wrongfully returned in the original prosecution for manslaughter? Cer-
tainly this would not be a just result,14 as the effect would be to force the defend-
ant to run the gauntlet of consecutive prosecutions identical in every way except
the name of the deceased. The reasons for requiring an end to litigation between
to sustain that prosecution. Thus, it is reasoned, the second prosecution is not
for the same offense and not prohibited by the double jeopardy provision. People
v. Allen, 368 IIl. 368, 379, 14 N.E.2d 397, 403 (1937); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St.
539, 542, 96 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1951). This appears to be a rather technical applica-
tion of the test.
8. Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 70, 219 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1949), held that
conscious and deliberate disregard for the safety of others is behavior which
"borders so closely upon that motivated by actual intent that we have no hesitancy
in saying that the same reasoning is applicable." The court was repudiating the
"single intent" reasoning of the minority in Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 682, 21
S.W.2d 400, 402 (1929).
9. State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 54, 272 N.W. 353, 358 (1937), held that
because of present day conditions a narrow construction cannot be given to the
state's right to protect its people.
10. McHugh v. State, 160 Fla. 823, 36 So.2d 768 (1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 918 (1949); Fleming v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 209, 144 S.W.2d 220 (1940).
11. Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 71, 219 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1949) (McFaddin,
J" concurring): "Our statute defines manslaughter as: 'the killing of a human
being. . . .' I emphasize that the crime relates to 'a human being' and not to 'hu-
man beings.... Our statute does not give a criminal a bargain rate on wholesale
homicides."
12. State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933); State v. Cos-
grove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 A. 871 (1927); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21
S.W.2d 400 (1929). See generally, Annot., 172 A.L.R. 1053, 1062 (1948).
13. Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 682, 21 S.W.2d 400, 402 (1929).
14. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 475 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing): "The vice in this procedure lies in relitigating the same issue on the same
evidence before two different juries with a man's innocence or guilt at stake. This
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the same parties of an issue of fact once it has been directly put in issue and de-
termined by a court of competent jurisdiction is stronger in criminal cases than
in civil cases. The harrassment factor in subsequent relitigation is greater in the
criminal case as there is a great disparity in the resources of the parties. The gov-
ernment has available relatively large amounts of funds and legal manpower to
utilize in successive actions.15 "Further, a new action is a more serious matter
for the defendant than in the civil context, since he may be incarcerated pending
the new trial if bail cannot be obtained."'8
The injustice of such a result can be avoided if the rule of collateral estoppel
is given "reasonable effect."' 7 The court in the Whitely case expressly reserved any
judgment as to the applicability of collateral estoppel in a case of this nature, say-
ing "Appellant pleaded guilty to each of the three charges of manslaughter. There-
fore, the question of the application of the doctrine of 'collateral estoppel' does
not arise."18
The applicability of collateral estoppel to criminal cases was first recognized
in Rex v. Duchess of Kingston'9 and is now widely accepted.20 However, its appli-
cability in Missouri is uncertain. In State v. Ast, 2 ' defendant had been acquitted
of the robbery of A, at a gambling table. In a subsequent prosecution for the rob-
bery of B the court refused to apply the doctrine as a bar to the jury's finding
that defendant was guilty of the robbery of B, another player at the same table
at the same time. In so refusing, the court quoted language from State v. Hoag
22
15. Mayers, New Tiiais and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HA.v. L. REV. 1, 32
(1960).
16. Ibid.
17. In State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 167, 180 Atl. 266, 270 (1935), the
court makes collateral estoppel virtually meaningless by quoting from Bell v.
State, 57 Md. 108, 116 (1881): "An acquittal of a party does not ascertain or
determine any precise facts. It may have resulted from insufficiency of evidence
as to some particular fact, where several facts are necessary ingredients of the
crime." Such a statement ignores the record of the evidence in the prior trial and
limits the possibility of a bar by collateral estoppel to situations where the prior
offense was in all its elements included in the second offense.
18. State v. Whitely, supra note 1, at 668.
19. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 538 (1776).
20. Annot., 147 A.L.R. 999 (1941); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy
and Res Judicata, 39 IoWA L. Rav. 317, 330 (1953).
21. State v. Ash, 350 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1961).
22. State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 562, 114 A.2d 573, 577 (1955), aff'd,
21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), affd, Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
Note that the court in Hoag v. New Jersey failed to decide whether the application
of collateral estoppel in favor of a defendant in a criminal case was a constitutional
requirement of due process, saying at 471, "Despite its wide employment, we enter-
tain grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional
requirement. Certainly this court has never so held. However, we need not decide
that question." The court then held, "Keeping in mind the fact that jury verdicts
are sometimes inconsistent or irrational, . . . we cannot say that the New Jersey
Supreme Court exceeded constitutionally permissible bounds in concluding that
the jury might have acquitted petitioner at the earlier trial because it did not
believe that the victims of the robbery had been put in fear, or that property had
been taken from them or for other reasons unrelated to the issue of identity." 356
U.S. at 472.
8
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to the effect that the court was confident that prosecutors would not resort to un-
fair multiple indictments and successive trials in order to accomplish indirectly
what the constitutional interdiction against double jeopardy precludes.
It is hoped State v. Ask 23 has not precluded the application of collateral estop-
pel in any criminal case. A case involving multiple deaths arising from an auto-
mobile accident can of course be distinguished from the Ask case on the basis
that the state of mind required for the offense of manslaughter is different from
that required for robbery. Further, in the Ask case the court said the verdicts were
not necessarily inconsistent, because in the first trial where A was the alleged victim
of the robbery the jury may not have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
property was taken from him, whereas, in the second prosecution for the robbery
of B they found property had been taken from him. If on an examination of the
record, pleadings and evidence submitted, such issue was in fact not decided in
the first case, then of course collateral estoppel would not bar a prosecution for
the robbery of B. However, in a case where the defendant in a single accident
kills two or more people who are riding in the same car, these numerous possi-
bilities for failure of the state's case do not arise. If in the first case causation or
death were not the basis of the favorable verdict, as it seldom is, then a finding
of guilty in a second prosecution would of necessity be inconsistent, as all other
elements of the state's case are identical.
In such a case collateral estoppel should be available to the defendant to avoid
the injustice of allowing the state to relitigate the same issue on the same evidence
before a second jury. As was said in United States v. Oppenkeimer,24 where the
court explicitly held that collateral estoppel was applicable to criminal cases, "It
surely cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly men-
tioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in
debt."25 Protection from so potent a weapon as harassment by unjustifiable multi-
ple prosecutions should not be left to the conscience of the local prosecutor.28
ALBERT W. DILLARD
23. State v. Ash, supra note 22.
24. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1917).
25. Id. at 87.
26. For a discussion of the problems involved in separate prosecutions for
multiple offenses arising from a single transaction and a possible solution, see Hun-
vald, Criminal Law in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 369 (1960). For a discussion of
the application of collateral estoppel to criminal cases, see Mager, Double Jeopardy
and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes Arising From the Same Transaction, 24 Mo.
L. REv. 513 (1959).
1966]
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In August 1955, defendant Wehmeyer (hereinafter referred to as mortgagor2 )
borrowed $2,600 from plaintiff Noelker (hereinafter referred to as mortgageea)
and executed a promissory note for $2,600 secured by a deed of trust. Five years
later mortgagor, in fear of losing his equity of redemption because of liability
arising from an auto accident, executed a warranty deed conveying the property
to mortgagee. The note and deed of trust were subsequently released of record.
Mortgagor remained in possession.
The subsequent agreements and relations between mortgagor and mortgagee
were confusing to say the least. Mortgagee testified that mortgagor was to pay
him $20 per month rent, that mortgagee took title to the property on condition
that he could build a dam and lake and repair a road, and that mortgagor would
pay for such improvements when he exercised his right to redeem. Mortgagor
testified that mortgagee were merely to hold the title to the property until
mortgagor's liability from the auto accident was settled and then reconvey upon
payment by mortgagor of the admitted principal and interest due on the money
borrowed.
In June 1961, after certain now disputed consultations, mortgagee began
building a dam and road. After the dam was finished and the road partially
completed mortgagor stopped further work by blocking the road. Mortgagee then
brought suit in ejectment. Mortgagor counter-claimed alleging that mortgagee's
deed had been procured by fraud and asking that the property be reconveyed to
him upon payment of his admitted indebtedness.
The trial court determined the deed was not procured by fraud, but was
intended as an equitable mortgage for security.4 The trial court decree further
provided that upon payment by mortgagor of the indebtedness and $4,765.02 to
reimburse mortgagee for his improvements, mortgagee should reconvey the property
to mortgagor. Mortgagor failed to make the payments and the trial court entered
a final decree on mortgagee's petition for ejectment and against mortgagor's
counter-claim. 5
On appeal mortgagor accepted the trial court's determination of equitable
mortgage, arguing only that (1) mortgagee should not be entitled to reimburse-
ment for improvements, and (2) if mortgagee is entitled to reimbursement for
improvements, it should only be $1,500 rather than $4,765.02. The St. Louis Court
1. 392 S.W.2d 409 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Defendant Wehmeyer occupied successive positions of mortgagor, grantor,
and tenant.
3. Plaintiff Noelker occupied successive positions of mortgagee, grantee, and
landlord.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/8
RECENT CASES
of Appeals rejected both of mortgagor's contentions ind affirrhe'd the.'trial court
decision.6
The purpose of this note is not to criticise the result of the instant case.
Rather the purpose is twofold: first, to comment briefly on the failure of the court
to discuss fully the question of reimbursing the mortgagee for his improvements;
second, to point out the inherent dangers in using an absolute deed in lieu of, or in
conjunction with, foreclosure.
The court in the noted case concluded that plaintiff Noelker was an equitable
mortgagee.7 The essential fact situation, therefore, is a mortgagee making improve-
ments on the mortgagor's premises.8 The general rule is that a mortgagee cannot
improve a mortgagor out of his equity of redemption. 9 That is, a mortgagee cannot
make it more difficult for the mortgagor to redeem by charging the mortgagor with
the costs of improving his property. Generally a mortgagee is to be credited with
the reasonable cost of any repairs of the mortgaged premises, 10 but not for any
improvements."1 This general rule is subject to the exception that a mortgagee,
thinking he is a bona fide owner, generally is entitled to the value of any improve-
ments he adds.1 2 This situation usually arises when a mortgagee thinks he has
obtained good title by purchasing at a foreclosure sale, but in fact title is de-
fective because of failure to join a necessary party. The non-joined party whose
equity of redemption is not effectively foreclosed is thereafter permitted to redeem.
The court in the instant case did not decide whether the mortgagee was a
bona fide purchaser. For the purpose of this decision it merely assumed he was
not.13 The court found that the mortgagee expended the money -for the improve-
ments "with the knowledge and consent of defendant [mortgagor]." 14 The court
therefore reasoned that to deny the mortgagee reimbursement for his improvements
would be inequitable and would have unjustly enriched the mortgagor.15
The court's decision would have been sounder if it had discussed the .possibil-
ity that the mortgagee was not a bona fide purchaser and that he did not make
6. Supra note 1, at 413. Note that the court -failed to indicate just what type
of foreclosure procedure was to be used. The opinion seems to indicate that strict
foreclosure will result since no mention is made of judicial foreclosure or foreclosure
under a nonjudicial power of sale.
7. Id. at 410.
8. Note that in the instant case the mortgagee was making improvements
on the premises while the mortgagor was still in possession. The "improvements"
problem usually arises when the mortgagee makes improvements after obtaining
possession from the mortgagor.
9. 2 JONES, MORTGAGES, § 1382 (8th ed. 1928); 36 Am. JuR. Mortgages § 311
(1941); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 330 (1949).
10. Baker v. Cunningham, 162 Mo. 134, 62 S.W. 445 (1901).
11. Supra note 9.
12. Boatmen's Say. Bank v. Grewe, 101 Mo. 625, 14 S.W. 708 (1890); Martin
v. Ratcliff, 101 Mo. 254, 13 S.W. 1051 (1890). See also the Missouri Betterment
Act § 524.160, RSMo (1959).
13. Supra note 1, at 412.
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the improvements with knowledge and consent of the mortgagor, If this were
the case, the mortgagee would not have been entitled to reimbursement for the
improvements'6 unless he made the improvements thinking he was a bona fide
purchaser.' 7
The motivation for using an absolute deed in lieu of, or in conjunction with,
foreclosure is almost always the expense and time involved in foreclosure.18 While
this may be a valid reason in other jurisdictions, it is not in Missouri. Missouri's
foreclosure procedure under a nonjudicial power of sale in the deed of trust is
relatively short and inexpensive.10 There is simply no compelling reason in Mis-
souri to resort to such alternative methods of foreclosure. Furthermore to use such
a transaction in lieu of foreclosure, as the parties here did, involves three principal
dangers.
First there is a danger of intervening liens or other interests. That is, the
grantee of the purported absolute deed will take subject to any interests derived
from the mortgagor-grantor that arise between execution of the mortgage and the
conveyance20 By contrast, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale takes title free of
interests subsequent to the date of the mortgage.21 For the grantee in the absolute
deed arrangement to be certain he obtains absolute title, he would have to obtain
a quitclaim deed from everyone who could possibly have a piece of the mortgagor's
equity of redemption. Furthermore even if the mortgagee-grantee checks the record
for intervening interests there is a question whether he would take free of un-
recorded interests. He may not be a purchaser for value if he takes merely in satis-
faction of the antecedent debt. Also if the conveyance to the mortgagee-grantee
is by quitclaim deed he may take with "notice" of certain unrecorded interests 22
Second, there is an underlying idea that the mortgagor and mortgagee are
not of equal bargaining strength.23 It is therefore entirely possible, especially if
16. Supra note 9.
17. Supra note 12.
18. While this is ordinarily the case, here the motivation for using an absolute
deed was to defraud defendant Wehmeyer's creditors. For a general survey of the
expense and time involved in mortgage foreclosure see Russell & Bridewell, Mortgage
Loan Closing Costs, 7 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 8 (1941).
19. §§ 443.290-.440, RSMo 1959.
20. For example, assume a mortgage executed on Jan. 1, 1960. On Jan. 1,
1961 a judgment lien is perfected against the land. If thereafter an absolute deed
is used in lieu of foreclosure, the grantee would take subject to the judgment lien.
Also mortgagor can convey or mortgage his equity in the interim.
21. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Shankman, 240 Mo. App. 639, 652, 212 S.W.2d 794,
801 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948).
22. 2 GILL, Rmu. ESTATE PRACTICE IN MissouRi 890-95 (1949). If the mort-
gagee-grantee takes by warranty deed and gives adequate present consideration this
problem is obviated.
23. "The mortgagor may make a subsequent release of the equity of redemp-
tion . . . but the transaction must in all respects be fair, with no unconscientious
advantage taken by the mortgagee." Lipscomb v. Talbott, 243 Mo. 1, 33, 147 S.W.
798, 807 (1912). "Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to
answer a pressing exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose
upon them." Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762).
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/8
RECENT CASES
the consideration paid is disproportionately less than the value of the equity or
if none is paid where the equity has value, that the whole transaction will be con-
strued as unfair and unconscionable. 24 The courts will either permit the mortgagor
to redeem at this point or restore the original mortgagor-mortgagee relationship.
Third, courts are very reluctant to allow the mortgagee to fetter or clog the
mortgagor's equity of redemption.25 The whole transaction therefore may be
construed as an equitable mortgage with an equity of redemption, unlimited as
to time, which would have to be foreclosed. The holding in the instant case that
the purported absolute conveyance was, in actuality, an equitable mortgage clearly
illustrates this point.26
It should be noted that any time an absolute deed is used in lieu of foreclosure
the parties should effectuate a clean and absolute break in their relationship. Any
continued relationship between the parties makes it more likely that the pur-
ported absolute conveyance will be construed an equitable mortgage.
In recent Missouri publication it is suggested that such transactions in lieu of
foreclosure are "perfectly acceptable and will accomplish the desired purpose... !,2T
Such a statement ignores the last two pitfalls or dangers previously mentioned.
Since Missouri's foreclosure procedure under a nonjudicial power of sale in the
trustee is relatively quick and inexpensive, 28 there is no real reason to use alterna-
tive procedures in lieu of foreclosure.
In short, such transactions in lieu of foreclosure in Missouri serve no useful
purpose. Possibility of litigation makes the title unmarketable. If litigation actually
results, it can be very expensive in both time and money. It would appear that in
Missouri a nonjudicial sale under the power of a deed of trust should always be
used.
STEPHEN H. RoMINES
24. Niggeler v. Maurin, 34 Minn. 118, 24 N.W. 369 (1885). In Baugher v.
Merryman, 32 Md. 185, 192 (1869), it was held that "[Ulnless the transaction ap-
pears to be fair, and unmixed with any advantage taken by the mortgagee of the
necessitous circumstances of the mortgagor, equity will hold the parties to their
original relation of debtor and creditor." See also 1 JoNEs, MORTGAGES, § 302 (8th
ed. 1928).
25. "When once it is determined to be a mortgage, all the consequences of
account, redemption and the like, follow, notwithstanding stipulations to the con-
trary." (Emphasis added.) Sheppard v. Wagner, 240 Mo. 409, 438-41, 144 S.W.
394, 403-04 (1912). "A man will not be suffered in conscience to fetter himself
with a limitation or restriction of his time of redemption. It would ruin the distressed
and unwary, and give unconscionable advantage to greedy and designing persons."
Spurgeon v. Collier, 1 Eden 55, 28 Eng. Rep. 605, 606 (1758).
26. Supra note 4. See also Lynch v. Ryan, 132 Wis. 271, 111 N.W. 707 (1907).
27. Mo. BAR, REAL ESTATE PRAcTIcE-Mo. § 7.19 (1964).
28. Supra note 19.
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SEARCH WARRANTS-PROBABLE CAUSE-MISSOURI RULE
State v. Taylor1
Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property. His sole contention on
appeal was that the court erred in not sustaining his motion to quash the search
warrants and suppress the evidence. Three search warrants had been issued on
three sworn complaints. The complaints and search warrants were identical ex-
cept for the property described and the places to be searched. Each complaint was
a bald, yet positive, statement that certain stolen property 2 was being held at a
certain described location,3 wherefore the complainant prayed that a search war-
rant be issued. There were no supporting affidavits or other written statements.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, basing its decision on the
constitutionality of Rule 33.01 of the Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule
33.01 provides, in part, that if a written complaint is filed with the judge of a
court having original criminal jurisdiction stating that personal property which
has been stolen is being held within the territorial jurisdiction of such judge, and
"if such complaint be verified by the oath or affirmation of the complainant and
states such fact positively and not on information or belief," then such judge
shall issue the search warrant.
The essence of the present decision is that a search warrant will issue in Mis-
souri upon a sworn complaint which states "positively" that certain stolen property
is being held at a described location.4 The court requires no further evidentiary
facts to be stated.5 No explanation of how the complainant acquired this "positive
knowledge" or why he knows the "positive statement" to be true is needed.0 The
instant case is substantially in accord with earlier Missouri decisions. 7
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
[A~nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized.8
1. 391 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1965).
2. Exhibit 3 is representative of the property described in the complaints:
Men's clothing, consisting of 35 top coats, 24 sport coats, 24 student's suits, 139
dress suits; and Ladies clothing, consisting of 7 coats and 9 car-coats.
3. A grey one-story frame house, with a blue composition roof, and a base-
ment, at 5409 Laurel, in Raytown, Jackson County, Missouri.
4. Supra note 1, at 932.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. State v. Brugioni, 320 Mo. 202, 7 S.W.2d 262 (1928); State v. Naething,
318 Mo. 531, 300 S.W. 829 (1927); State v. Stevens, 316 Mo. 602, 292 S.W. 36
(1927).
8. The Missouri counterpart, Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 25, is to the same effect:
"and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue
without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized,
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The Supreme Court of the United States has held the fourth amendment's proscrip-
tions enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment 9 The Court
has further held that the standards of reasonableness are the same under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.' 0
In the present case defendant contended that the portion of Rule 33.01 which
reads "and if such complaint be verified by the oath or affirmation of the com-
plainant and states such facts positively and not upon information or belief," is
unconstitutional. The question thus raised is what, if any, is the distinction between
the constitutional requirement of probable cause and the statement of positive
fact which, according to the instant case, will suffice under Rule 33.01.
Federal decisions in this area have set forth two related precepts. The first
is that the facts stated in the complaint must be based on the personal experience
of the complainant or information supplied to him by reliable informants." The
second is that the complaint may not be based solely on the belief of the com-
plainant.'2 The Missouri court was able to distinguish the instant case (1) be-
cause the Missouri court assumes that a complainant who states facts positively is
either speaking from personal experience or from information supplied by reliable
informants,' 3 and (2) because the Missouri court assumes that positive statements
are not based on the belief of the complainant.14 Both assumptions are open to
question. The Supreme Court of Missouri has taken Rule 33.01, which requires
that the facts be stated positively and not upon information or belief, and applied
it so that the positive statement alone satisfies the "not upon information or be-
lief" requirement.
Does a positive statement guarantee the complainant is speaking from per-
sonal experience? If it does not, there is a danger that search warrants may be
issued on information supplied by unreliable informants. A statement made posi-
tively is not necessarily limited to a statement made from -personal experience.
Positive statements may be based on information supplied by third persons. Never-
theless the Missouri court holds that there is no requirement that the court make
9. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), held that the exclusionary rule is of
constitutional origin. As such, it is a command of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment upon the courts of the states to exclude all evidence ob-
tained as a result of an-unreasonable search. When a search warrant is issued with-
out probable cause, the search becomes unreasonable. In all such cases, the product
of the search is inadmissible in evidence to establish guilt.
10. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963).
11. Baysden v. United States, 271 F.2d 325 (1959); United States v. Games,
258 F.2d 530 (1958).
12. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933).
13. This assumption is implied in the court's holding: "Finally, there is no
requirement that the court make a specific determination of the reliability of the
informant. The warrant recites, however, that a duly verified complaint had been
filed, and we 'hold this to be sufficient." Swpra note 1, at 932.
14. In distinguishing Aguilar v. Texas, supra note 9, in which the complaint
was written in terms of belief, the court held "This case is not in point because it
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a specific determination of the reliability of the informant.15 Although this holding
is not directly contrary to any federal decision it seems inconsistent with the rule
that search warrants be issued on hearsay information only if the informant is
reliable.
The second and broader distinction the Missouri Supreme Court makes is
between statements of belief and "positive" statements.10 The implication is that
positive statements are based on knowledge rather than belief and therefore re-
quire no further explanation. It is difficult to justify such a distinction between
knowledge and belief. The relevant distinction is not in the abstract but rather
concerns the practical matter of how the complainant draws the line between what
he says he knows and what he says he believes. This process is apparently a de-
termination in his own mind of how certain his statement is. It is a weighing of
information available to him and a decision as to the probability of his conclusion.
Presumably, if the information weighs heavily enough in his mind, he will con-
sider it knowledge rather than belief. The fallacy in the distinction is that the
positive statement is merely a result of a higher degree of certainty in the mind
of the believer. In other words, whether the complainant makes the statement in a
positive manner or upon belief depends solely on how certain he himself is. Why
should the distinction turn on the certainty of the complainant? Moreover, it is
not the complainant but the judge who should determine the degree of certainty.
The weighing of information is exactly what the judge is to do under the fourth
amendment when he determines probable cause.
But granting, for the time, that a positive statement will not be based on
information or belief, is Rule 33.01 constitutional as stated? Should not the com-
plainant be required to explain why he can make the statement in a positive
manner? Why he is so convinced of its truth? The language of the court in
Giordenello v. United States17 would seem to indicate that something more than
a mere conclusion by the complainant is required:
When the complaint in this case is judged with these considerations in
mind, it is clear that it does not pass muster because it does not provide
any basis for the Commissioner's determination under Rule 4 that prob-
able cause existed. The complaint contains no affirmative allegation that
the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein;
it does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and it does
not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable
cause could be made.1s
The court in the noted case distinguished Giordenello on the two grounds discussed
aboveL9 but the language of Giordenetlo would seem to mean that the judge
must have some basis for determining probable cause. The predetermination of
probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate is the whole essence of the
15. Supa note 13.
16. Supra note 14.
17. 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
18. Ibid.
19. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
(Vol. 31
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fourth amendment. It is a judicial function and may not be delegated to the
complainant. 20
Can the Missouri rule fully guarantee a judicial determination? In Missouri
the complainant need only make the required "positive" statement and the magis-
trate must issue the warrant.21 In no sense is the magistrate left anything to de-
cide. Only the complainant knows how certain the "positive" statement is. Under
the Missouri rule the judge can make, at best, only a "rubber stamp" determina-
tion of probable cause.
WILLIAM V. MORGAN
TORTS-RETENTION OF CONTROL BY LANDLORD
Green v. Kaknl
On the evening of March 4, 1960, a fire broke out in an apartment occupied by
tenant, Shirley Green, and her children. Shirley died in the fire and her daughter,
Debra, suffered severe burns. Debra brought an action against the landlords for
personal injuries, alleging defendants were negligent in supplying an open gas
cooking range for heating purposes. Evidence at the trial tended to show that the
pipe supplying gas extended from a front building back and into three apartments,
one of which was rented by plaintiff's mother. Attached to the branch of the pipe
in Shirley Green's apartment was the open gas range, supplied for heating as well
as cooking purposes, and apparently the source of the fire. A witness for defendants
testified that on the evening of the fire she had been in Shirley's apartment and
had observed that wet blankets were hanging approximately eighteen inches over
the flames from the stove burners. 2 A member of the bombing and arson squad of
the police department inspected the apartment after the fire was extinguished and
determined that the fire had originated near the stove approximately three feet
above the floor. He testified that the cause of the fire was "blankets over the
stove."
3
20. "Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed
a magistrate between the citizen and the police .... It was done so that an ob-
jective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is
a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be
trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the
police before they violate the privacy of the home." McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
21. This is provided, of course, the statement is sworn to, and adequately
describes both the stolen property and the place to be searched.
1. 391 -S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1965).
2. Any contributory negligence on the part of Shirley Green would not be
imputable to the plaintiff in her personal injury action, but could be considered
as a concurring cause. Id. at 277.
3. Id. at 273.
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The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the trial court sustained de-
fendants' motion for judgment in accordance with their motion for a directed ver-
dict at the close of all the evidence. On appeal the Missouri Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded, 4 holding that there was substantial evidence that defendants
were negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause5 of the fire and
resulting injury to plaintiff.
An interesting aspect of this case is the use of the following rule of law to
impose a duty upon the defendants:
A landlord is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the por-
tions of the premises which he retains in his control in a reasonably safe
condition for the use intended and is liable in damages for personal injuries
resulting from his failure to perform that duty.6
The duty resulting from retention of control seems to be based on principles
of invitation, for it extends to those persons rightfully using the premises.7 This
control rule is firmly established throughout most of the United States,8 but a
few jurisdictions, notably Massachusetts, use a rather peculiar modification. In
Regan v. NelsonO the Massachusetts Superior Court pointed out that the land-
lord's duty with respect to common passageways which are within his control is to
use reasonable care to keep them in as safe a condition as they were, or appeared
to be, at the time the tenancy was created.10 This Massachusetts limitation on the
duty imposed by the landlord's retention of control applies only to common ap-
proaches or passageways and is therefore not significant in the present situation."
The control rule appears most frequently where the injury is caused by some
defect in a stairway,12 passageway,13 porch,14 or the like; but logically there ap-
pears no reason why the rule should not extend to any agency or instrumentality
4. The court remanded for new trial because of prejudicial jury instructions.
Id. at 278.
5. The noted case contains an interesting discussion of proximate cause.
6. Supra note 1, at 274.
7. Morelock v. DeGraw, 234 Mo. App. 303, 112 S.W.2d 126 (K.C. Ct. App.
1937); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417b(1) (1947).
8. 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417b(6) (1947).
-9. 345 Mass. 678, 189 N.E.2d 516 (1963).
10. Id. at 680, 189 N.E.2d at 518. See Crea v. Stunzenas, 344 Mass. 265, 267,
182 N.E.2d 141, 142 (1962); McDonald v. Yogel, 329 Mass. 492, 494, 109 N.E.2d
136, 137 (1952); McGeorge v. Grand Realty Trust, Inc., 316 Mass. 373, 375, 55
N.E.2d 694, 695 (1944); Blaufarb v. Drooker, 251 Mass. 201, 204, 146 N.E. 242, 243(1925).
11. Regan v. Nelson, supra note 9; Gilroy v. Badger, 301 Mass. 494, 496, 17
N.E.2d 702, 703 (1938); Yorra v. Lynch, 226 Mass. 153, 155, 115 N.E. 238, 239(1917). But see Kelley v. First Nat'l Bank, 281 Mass. 169, 172, 183 N.E. 174, 175
(1932); Shea v. McEvoy, 220 Mass. 239, 242, 107 N.E. 945, 947 (1915).
12. Roman v. King, 289 Mo. 641, 233 S.W. 161 (1921); McGinley v. Alliance
Trust Co., 168 Mo. 257, 66 S.W. 153 (1901). See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 364 (1952).
13. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 444 (1952).
14. Peterson Y. Brune, 273 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1954); Schneider v. Dubinsky
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which the landlord controls. In fact, the rule has frequently been applied to de-
fective appliances,' 5 and to heating, water and electrical systems.' 6 The court in
the noted case was careful to point out that the rule applies not only to defects
in structural portions of the building, but also to unsafe conditions in agencies
and appliances.17 If there was ever any real doubt of this Marentette v. Luechte-
feldI8 answered the question. In that case the refrigeration pipe in tenants apart-
ment was pinched shut after the refrigerator was removed. Later gas escaped, in-
juring plaintiff's daughter. The court held that the control rule was applicable to
the pipe extending into the apartment.' 9 Likewise, in Thompson v. Paseo Manor
South, Inc. 20 the court held that defendant-landlord was in control of the unin-
sulated heating pipes in plaintiff-tenant's apartment, and that this control imposed
a duty to use ordinary care to keep said pipes in a reasonably safe condition.m 2
Plaintiff in the present case did not allege, nor did the court attempt to find,
control of the gas range as a separate unit. Rather the control theory is based
on the idea of a system. The court found substantial evidence to warrant a finding
that the gas pipes extending from defendants' building to the rear building which
contained plaintiff's apartment, and the stoves attached to branches of the piping
in the three apartments, constituted an integrated system, controlled by de-
fendants, and for use by the tenants as a group. Viewed in this manner the gas
stove clearly falls within the control rule as expressed in Thompson and Marentette.
It could scarcely be argued that defendants did not retain control of the gas lines
or that said lines did not constitute a system for use in common by the tenants.
Defendants, however, in an effort to persuade the court that the stove should be
considered as a separate agency, argued that complete control of the stove was in
the tenant. The court dismissed this argument summarily as a confusion between
"use" and "right of control." 22 As pointed out in Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop,
Inc.23 fixtures of this type "are not isolated either in use or maintenance." 24 Be-
cause they are supplied by the landlord and attached permanently to a common
system upon which they are dependent for operation it seems natural to consider
them a part of that system.
15. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 576 (1952).
16. Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., 168 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Ward-
man v. Hanlon, 280 Fed. 988 (D.C. Cir. 1922); see Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 791
(1962), 86 A.L.R.2d 838 (1962). RESTATEmENT (SECOND), Tomrs §§ 360, 361
(1965), indicates that the control rule properly applies to systems as well as com-
mon passageways.
17. Green v. Kahn, supra note 1, at 274.
18. 268 S.W.2d 44 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
19. Id. at 47.
20. 331 S.W.2d 1 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
21. Id. at 5-6. For an unusual, contrary opinion see Yuppa v. Whittaker, 88
R.I. 214, 217, 145 A.2d 255, 257 (1958), wherein the court said, "It is not the con-
trol of the source of the heat in the central heating system which is the decisive
factor but rather the control of the premises wherein existed the particular heated
pipe which caused the injury."
22. Green v. Kahn, supra note 1, at 275.
23. Supra note 16.
24. Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., supra note -16, at 322 (cited in Green
v. Kahn, supra note 1, at 274).
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- Once the landlords' control of the gas range has been established a second
feature of the rule comes into play. The landlords' duty is to use reasonable care
to keep the agency reasonably safe for the use intended. The negative statement
of this seems to be that a landlord does not have a duty, in the absence of
knowledge, to use reasonable care to keep the agency reasonably safe for an un-
authorized and improper use. 25 Had the stove been supplied only for the usual
cooking purposes, defendants would not have been under a duty of reasonable
.care with regard to safety for heating purposes. Thus, a critical point in the case
is the fact that defendants supplied a cooking stove to be used as a heater. Their
duty then arose as to such intended use. The range was apparently in a reasonably
safe condition for use as a cooking stove,20 but as a heater it was dangerous be-
cause of the open flames.
' It seems that under the control rule in Missouri a "system" for use by the
tenants in common now includes not only the pipes or wires which extend through-
out the building, and the extensions which pass into the separate living quarters,
but also appliances supplied by the landlord, attached to such extensions, and de-
pendent upon the system for operation. Although Thompson and Marentette stand
for something close to this same proposition, it is most clearly and distinctly ex-
pressed in Green v. Kahn, which represents the broadest Missouri view of systems
,over which the landlord retains control. The extent to which various appliances
may be deemed -part of a greater system is not clear. Suffice it to say that the po-
tential breadth of a landlord's duty under the control rule has not yet been
'limited.
DAviD K. HARDy
25. Weaver v. Schneider Realty Co., 381 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Mo. 1964);
Harakas v. Dickie, 224 Mo. App. 171, 175, 23 S.W.2d 651, 653 (K.C. Ct. App.
1929); Seaman v. Henriques, 139 Conn. 561, 565, 95 A.2d 701, 703 (1953).
26. There was some evidence tending to show that the valves on the burners
of the stove were defective, but the court did not consider this in reaching its deci-
sion. Green v. Kahn, supra note 1, at 274.
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